Spacetime functionalism in general relativity and quantum gravity by Crowther, Karen et al.
Spacetime functionalism in general relativity and
quantum gravity
Karen Crowther∗, Niels Linnemann†, and Christian Wu¨thrich‡
20 May 2020
Physics has seen decades of efforts to come to grips with the foundations
of quantum physics and to articulate a quantum theory of gravity. Despite
many promising ideas and occasional breakthroughs, progress has been slow.
In recent years, more and more philosophers of physics have arrived at the
conclusion that a key to progressing on at least some stubborn problems in the
foundations of physics may be to reconceive the notion of spacetime in ways that
transcend the basic substantivalist or relationalist positions. In the foundations
of quantum mechanics, general relativity (GR), and quantum gravity, spacetime
functionalism has emerged as a promising approach to the vexed issue of the
nature of spacetime. In quantum mechanics and in GR, spacetime functionalism
has opened new interpretative avenues, and in quantum gravity it is possibly
essential for understanding how spacetime emerges from a fundamentally non-
spatiotemporal structure. In light of these recent developments, this special
issue on spacetime functionalism in GR and quantum gravity offers a timely
collection of newly written articles advancing our growing appreciation of the
promises—and the limitations—of spacetime functionalism.
The motivation for a functionalist approach in any area of philosophy is the
recognition that many concepts of interest are multiply-realisable: functionalism
holds that a given concept of interest is best understood by means of the role
that concept plays, rather than by (any, or all, of) its specific instances or
realisations. Functionalism is most familiar in the context of philosophy of
mind, where it is the statement that what makes something a mental state of
a certain type is determined by the way it functions—the role it plays—in the
system of which it is a part. Motivating this view is the belief that a mental
state is not primarily linked to the internal constitution of the creature which
experiences it, but rather is multiply-realisable in different types of creatures
with a rather different material constitution. The canonical example is the
mental state of ‘being in pain’, which may be characterised as a state that tends
to be caused by bodily injury or disease, to produce the belief that something
is wrong with the body and the desire to be out of that state, and to typically
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cause wincing or wailing (Levin, 2018). A functionalist perspective would say
that all and only those creatures whose internal states meet these conditions,
or play these roles, are in pain. In humans, this state might be realised by a
particular type of neural activity, such as C-fibre stimulation—in which case, a
human is in pain just in case they are undergoing C-fibre stimulation. The state
of being in pain, however, could also be realised in different ways in creatures
whose internal compositions are very different from those of human beings.
As the example shows, a functionalist approach to understanding a particular
concept involves two steps. First, the concept must be defined in terms of
its functional role—in other words, a functionalist must establish (or, at least,
assert) that there is nothing more to the concept in question than the particular
role that the functionalist specifies. In the example above, this involves asking
‘What is the functional role of ‘being in pain’?’, which yields the characterisation
of ‘being a state that tends to be caused by bodily injury or disease, to produce
the belief that there is something wrong with the body, etc.’. The second step
involves then identifying, within the particular system of interest, the entity
(structure, or process) that fulfils this role and to show how it does so.
Spacetime functionalism is the employment of functionalism to understand
the concept of spacetime in the context of physical theories. As modern theories
of physics have become increasingly sophisticated, it has become less obvious
which structures in these theories should be taken as spacetime. Spacetime
functionalism proceeds from the belief that spacetime is multiply-realisable by
different structures, depending on the theory in which they feature. Spacetime
functionalism states that what it is to be spacetime is nothing other than to fulfil
a particular functional role. In identifying a particular structure as spacetime
within a theory, the functionalist must follow the two-step procedure outlined
above. First, they provide a definition of spacetime in terms of its functional
role; second, they point out that this role is played by some entity in the theory.
That entity which plays the functional role of spacetime in that theory, just is
spacetime.
Spacetime functionalism has in recent years come into prominence in differ-
ent areas of philosophy of physics. First, functionalism has been called to aid
in the context of non-relativistic quantum mechanics by David Wallace (2012)
in his defence of an Everettian interpretation and by David Albert (2013) in
order to explain the emergence of space(time) and its content in wave function
realism. Since time is supposed to be present at the fundamental level (together
with the wave function), the concern in this area is really the emergence of three-
dimensional physical space and three-dimensional objects in it from the wave
function inhabiting a much higher-dimensional space—3N -dimensional config-
uration space. Here, N is the total number of particles in the system described
by the theory, ultimately the entire universe. Thus, there is a sense in which this
is more of a ‘space’ functionalism, rather than spacetime functionalism. This
is different in the second and third subfields of philosophy of physics in which
spacetime functionalism has been deployed.
The second area is GR and related classical theories of spacetime, where the
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notion has been introduced by Eleanor Knox (2013, 2014, 2019).1 Spacetime
functionalism in this domain has a direct precursor in the dynamical approach
to GR articulated by Harvey Brown and Oliver Pooley (Brown, 2005; Brown and
Pooley, 2006). Simply put, the dynamical approach demands an explanation of
the ‘chronogeometric significance’ of the metric field, i.e., how rods and clocks
measure the metric field. For Brown, this significance is acquired in dynamic
coupling relations between the matter fields and the metric field, and does not
inhere in the metric field itself. Thus, chronogeometric significance is a func-
tional role that, first, can (at least partly) be attributed to various kind of fields,
and that, second, is instantiated only if adequate dynamical coupling relations
to other fields are in place. Given that chronogeometricity is usually seen as a
core feature of what we mean by spacetime, the dynamical approach can thus
naturally be conceived as a form of spacetime functionalism. Building on the
dynamical approach, Knox’s spacetime functionalism asserts that spacetime is
whatever plays the role of inertial structure.
The third area is quantum gravity. Many approaches to quantum gravity
seem to suggest that the fundamental structure of our world is much less spa-
tiotemporal than the manifest world is, or as it is according to GR. If such non-
spatiotemporality at the fundamental level is borne out, then it may render those
theories empirically incoherent (Huggett and Wu¨thrich, 2013) or non-physical
(Lam and Esfeld, 2013, §4.2). Incipient in their own response to the challenge
of empirical incoherence in Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013), Lam and Wu¨thrich
(2018) have recently argued much more explicitly in their response that space-
time functionalism can bridge the gap between possibly non-spatiotemporal
fundamental ontologies and the emerging spatiotemporality. In their view, it
is sufficient to demonstrate how the functionally relevant aspects of relativistic
spacetimes can be recovered from the fundamental structures in order to dispel
concerns about the non-spatiotemporality of ontologies in quantum theories of
gravity.
As the high-quality contributions at the international two-day conference on
spacetime functionalism at the University of Geneva (1-2 March 2018) showed,
the story does not end here. Spacetime functionalism has become an active
field of research which has seen many important contributions recently. Thus,
we sought to bring together much of this recent work in this special issue. As
editors, we are thankful to all contributing authors: their work not only shows
how much of an exciting research topic spacetime functionalism is, but in fact
significantly advance it. Or so we believe—may the reader be the judge!
The papers fall into two main groups: spacetime functionalism in GR and
related classical theories on the one hand, and in quantum gravity on the other.
In the following, let us briefly introduce the contributions to the special issue.
1The exact theoretical scope of this program is not clear, but it definitely involves general
relativistic and general relativistic-like theories as well as various variations of Newtonian
theories.
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Brief overview of the contributions
Spacetime functionalism in GR
The first paper of the special issue by James Read and Tushar Menon provides
constructive criticism of Knox’s version of spacetime fuctionalism. Read and
Menon show how inertial structure and the operational meaning of spacetime
can come apart in some models of GR and in some alternative classical space-
time theories. This divergence, they argue, is problematic for a programme
motivated to closely track the operational significance of spacetime. They dis-
cuss various ways to modify or amend Knox’s inertial-frame functionalism in
order to circumvent the problem. They end with a discussion of the relation be-
tween inertial-frame functionalism and the wider dynamical approach and argue
that these are largely orthogonal.
Jim Weatherall’s contribution, a straight-on reckoning with two ‘dogmas’
behind the dynamical approach, is thus a welcome contribution to this special
issue as it provides important clarification of widely held beliefs within the
dynamical approach camp. Weatherall’s paper, which he presents “in reaction
to and sympathy with” a recent paper by Read (forthcoming), identifies the two
dogmas as the ideas that, first, the stipulation of spacetime geometry has no
implications for the behaviour of matter, and, second, the postulation of what is
known as the ‘strong equivalence principle’ is enough to have matter be ‘adapted’
to spacetime geometry. Weatherall questions both of these ideas, and irenically
concludes that careful consideration of the details of the relationship between
dynamics and geometry dissolves much of the often advertised disagreement
between the geometrical and the dynamical approaches.
In his article, David Baker argues that Knox’s inertial-frame functionalism
fails to capture the richness of our concept of spacetime and so lacks the gen-
erality one would expect from a spacetime functionalist framework. According
to Baker, spacetime is a cluster concept: the criterion of playing the role of
inertial structure can neither be necessary nor sufficient for calling it spacetime.
Admittedly, Knox can easily bite the bullet that her or improved variants of her
account will in the end just be valid for a certain sector of spacetime theories.
Arguably more problematic, however, is Baker’s follow-up that fundamentality
can and is often traded as a central aspect of the spacetime concept—perhaps
even of more importance than inertial structure—but is not at all touched by
Knox’s functionalism.
A different form of functionalism in GR concerns the status of the energy-
momentum tensor in GR: should it perhaps be given a functionalist reading
as well, as suggested by Lam (2011) or Read (2020)? Patrick Du¨rr’s contri-
bution pursues this question. For this, he appraises functionalist accounts of
gravitational energies as opposed to, first and foremost, the eliminativist take
on gravitational energy by Carl Hoefer (2000); he arrives at the conclusion that
the realist case for gravitational energy via a functionalist account will require
substantive modification for it to prove fecund.
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Spacetime functionalism in QG
In their contribution, Vincent Lam and Christian Wu¨thrich follow up on their
earlier work having first applied spacetime functionalism to quantum gravity.
The main aim of their paper is to distinguish their form of spacetime func-
tionalism in motivation, scope, and implications from spacetime functionalism
as it has been advocated in the context of quantum mechanics and GR. Lam
and Wu¨thrich argue that their spacetime functionalism, unlike that in other ar-
eas, does not compete with alternative interpretations of the relevant theories.
Rather, it articulates and explicates the tasks of physical theorizing in quantum
gravity. As such, they conclude, it is perfectly compatible with a realist take on
quantum gravity, and even with a realist understanding of GR.
On their part, Michael Esfeld and Niels Linnemann are critical of the ex-
tent to which radical claims of spacetime emergence in quantum gravity are
ultimately justified. In his contribution, Esfeld likens the current stage of quan-
tum gravity research to the historical development of quantum mechanics and
quantum fields throughout which claims had been abundant that the theories
necessarily implied the dismissal of local ‘beables’—concrete local things that we
can straightforwardly take to be real—and thus the conception of spacetime in
any form. Just as the (putative) problem of the non-fundamentality of spacetime
in quantum mechanics has been circumvented by Bohmian mechanics, Esfeld
believes that the ontological problem so heavily problematised by philosophers
of quantum gravity might evaporate after sufficient interpretational work.
Baptiste Le Bihan differentiates the problem of empirical coherence through
identifying an epistemological and an ontological component whose difficulties
are respectively compared to that of the easy and the hard problem of con-
sciousness. Le Bihan’s differentiation, however, continues: depending on which
exact form of functionalism one adheres to, the hard problem is (dis)solved or
not solved at all; only the easy problem is straightforwardly solved as suggested
by Lam and Wu¨thrich (2018), or so Le Bihan argues.
Following largely Le Bihan in his distinction between the easy and the hard
problem, Linnemann argues that the easy problem (the epistemological problem
of empirical coherence) has been overstated by Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013)
from the start. Secondly, contra both Lam and Wu¨thrich (2018) and Le Bihan,
he seeks to establish that current approaches to QG do not feature a conceptual
gap problem worthy of the analogy to the hard problem of consciousness, and
that, if they did, functionalism as such could not dissolve it. Linnemann’s anal-
ysis seconds Esfeld’s expectation that the conceptual problems of the emergence
of spacetime will eventually evaporate by working out that none of the current
approaches lacks a codification of diachronicity in its structure—which, as he
argues, would be the only clear sign that there is no fundamental spacetime
structure in QG in the first place.
While accepting the problem of spacetime emergence and its resolution via
spacetime functionalism, Baron points out that the original issue regarding em-
pirical coherence in fact also involves a problem concerning the emergence of
‘entity’, i.e., matter or physical stuff: it is not only important to learn how a
5
notion of beable location arises out of putatively non-spatiotemporal structure
but also how the notion of a beable itself emerges. According to Baron, the
entity problem might, however, just as well be satisfactorily resolved in a func-
tionalist fashion; at least in the context of a matter-enhanced version of loop
quantum gravity (LQG), the matter model of quantum field theory (QFT) can
plausibly be seen as functionally realised (namely—and just like in the case of
spacetime—by LQG’s spin-network structure). In order to establish his point,
Baron makes use of proposals in the LQG community on how the so-called
helon model of particles may explain the emergence of entities with charge from
modified versions of LQG’s fundamental spin-network structure.
In order to deal with the spacetime functionalism in QG, Rasmus Jaksland—
like other contributors—refers to the philosophy of mind. He reads the multiple
realisability of the Einstein field equation by different underlying theories pos-
tulating different microscopic degree of freedom as a strong case for spacetime
functionalism, which is in direct analogy to the central argument in favour of
functionalism about mental states. The three theories considered—all of which
realise Einstein’s field equation—are Sakharov’s induced gravity (1967), Jacob-
son’s thermodynamic account of gravity (1995), and various forms of entangle-
ment accounts of gravity. Given how naturally these approaches can account for
GR, and thus how generic the emergence of Einstein’s field equation seems to
be, however, the recovery of GR is at best a necessary, but definitely not a suf-
ficient condition for the pursuit-worthiness of an approach to quantum gravity,
let alone its correctness.
Finally, Thomas Saad’s contribution bridges the gap between space func-
tionalism and philosophy of mind at the level of content rather than just the
methodological level: in his essay, he adjudicates whether certain experiences
of spatial properties are best accounted for in terms of specific experiential spa-
tial properties (spatial presentationalism) or as functional roles instantiated by
suitable spatial properties (spatial functionalism). Saad thus takes functional-
ism back to the mental. However, in the concrete context he considers, he does
not see a clear case for it as being established: whereas the posit of specific
experiential spatial properties may lead to the undesirable consequence of spa-
tial properties (currently) not incorporated by physical theories, functionalism
about these experiential spatial properties enforces an arguably unacceptable
dualism on us—not a path many of us are probably ready to take.
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